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Part I: Introductory
It is difficult to say whether prison life is ‘well’ supervised by judicial and other legal
authorities in England and Wales. This article explores a number of important bodies
which all have a role in monitoring what goes on in prisons: HM Chief Inspector of
Prisons, Independent Monitoring Boards, the Prison and Probation Ombudsman,
NGOs as well as the formal courts (including coroners’ inquests). It is particularly
difficult to ensure the fair treatment of prisoners within a system which gives wide and
discretionary powers to those who run prisons. The challenge is all the greater at a time
when prisons are increasingly privatised, and services are subject to increasing com-
petition. Prisons are run behind substantial walls, both solid and metaphorical. The
subject is under-explored in the literature – little has been written on the effectiveness of
prison monitoring, especially in the academic literature, and empirical studies are even
rarer. This article seeks to question what effective monitoring might look like,
questioning how ‘visible’ prisons and prisoners are to the outside world. There are
many eyes looking inside the prison: but what do they see, and what are they meant to
do about what they see?
The article explores the variety of structures and institutions in place, and concludes
that the closed world of the prison needs both complex accountability mechanisms and
clearer rules if high standards are to be effectively enforced1. Before discussing the
many individual mechanisms, three introductory issues are raised. First, the UK’s
‘National Preventative Mechanism’ (NPM), established under the Optional Protocol
to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (OPCAT). We need to consider whether this has been an effective
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addition to (umbrella over?) the many accountability mechanisms. We return at the end
to consider whether the NPM has made a useful contribution. The second preliminary
issue considered before we look at individual mechanisms is the changing face of
English prisons: namely, the increased use of ‘competition’ and privatization, both of
prison and probation services. The third and introductory question is defining the
boundaries of the ‘prison’.
The NPM
First, the NPM which is required to carry out a system of regular visits to places of
detention in order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Twenty different organizations have been designated to fulfill the UK’s
obligations under OPCAT2. This is in part because of the complexity of the United
Kingdom’s constitutional structure, but even if one excludes those bodies which look
only at prisons in Scotland and Northern Ireland, we are still left with a significant
number3. Constitutional and statutory controls in England are, in many ways, weak.
The UK has no formal written constitution, and Parliament has not chosen to create
strong legislative safeguards. But the main inspection bodies have fought hard to
maintain their ‘independence’ of Government. Of course, ‘independence’ is not nec-
essarily a driver of effective monitoring: too much ‘independence’ can mean a body is
isolated and ineffective4. Without more evidence it is impossible to conclude whether or
not the institutions we are reviewing are ‘effective’ and whether or not a stronger
legislative framework would help them to be more ‘effective’. Nor is it easy to find
hard evidence that European institutions5 have had any effect in driving up standards.
Despite academic work6 underlining the important role of the Council of Europe, it is
difficult to see its practical or significant impact in England. Politicians remain, and
indeed are becoming increasingly, sceptical about ‘Europe’. Following the ‘Brexit’ vote
of June 2016, the pressure for change coming from European institutions is increas-
ingly likely to be resisted. And standards in prison have generally been declining in
recent years, not improving.
2 The UK ratified OPCAT in December 2003, and the UK NPM was established only in 2009. See
http://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk and http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/07/NPM-Annual-Report-2014-15-web.pdf for the NPM’s latest (sixth) Annual
Report. An independent comparative and critical analysis of implementation across jurisdictions would be
useful.
3 This paper looks only at England and Wales, and indeed only at the main inspection bodies. There is a vital
role for the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) in raising educational standards in prisons and for the
Care Quality Commission (CQC) in raising health care standards. See http://www.ofsted.gov.
uk/furthereducationandskills for useful data.
4 Anyone studying this subject in England should also compare the ‘effectiveness’ of other ‘independent’
criminal justice institutions such as the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which oversees the
police complaints system, or the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the independent body which investi-
gates suspected miscarriages of justice.
5 Such as the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), the European Committee for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), even the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR). These bodies do not seem to be taken as seriously by either politicians or the media in the UK
as I would want.
6 See in particular van Zyl Smit and Snacken [18].
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Privatisation
The picture is complicated by the increasing privatisation of prisons. Can conditions be
adequately monitored in private prisons7? Of course, many services in prisons have
long been ‘privatised’. Prison medical services were only brought into the National
Health Service some ten years ago, but with the growing use of ‘markets’ within the
health sector, local health trusts and providers increasingly ‘contract out’ services to the
private sector. Education, so obviously useful to the rehabilitation and reintegration of
offenders, is also ‘contracted out’. Education (in particular, the delicate business of
teaching vocational and employment skills to a population who have often rejected
mainstream education in the past) should not simply be provided by the cheapest
provider. The increasing involvement of OFSTED is encouraging8. If a prison is to be
assessed and evaluated on the basis of the education it provides, the governor of the
prison should be surely accountable for the quality of education and training. In a recent
lecture, Matthew Coffey of OFSTED focused on Bstubbornly high reoffending rates
that are nearly 50% for adult prisoners and 72% for juveniles^. He said:
It is unacceptable that Ofsted judged only 35% of prisons good for their education
and training provision. If these figures related to our schools there would be a
national outcry. The aim is to reduce the number of reoffenders by focusing on
rehabilitation in prisons through better employer engagement and better teaching
and training.
Far too many prisoners leave prison without employability skills, meaning they
are less likely to find a job. Research shows that being in employment is one of
the key factors that can reduce the risk of reoffending by between 30-50%.
However, examples of good training provision in prisons were all too scarce. In
fact, we haven’t judged a single prison to be outstanding for their education and
training provision in the last four years9.
But today we are not now looking just at the privatisation of key services, but at the
management of entire prisons. There are currently 14 privately run prisons in England and
Wales, containing about 15% of the prison population. The first privately managed prison,
The Wolds, opened in 199210. Several more prisons were then built under the ‘Private
Finance Initiative’, with contracts awarded for the design, construction, management and
finance of a prison under 25 year contracts. Now we have the ‘market testing’ of existing
public sector prisons – after several ‘tests’, the first to be transferred to the private sector was
Birmingham in 201111. Private prisons have additional forms of accountability, notably the
contracts under which the standards are set. But these contracts are not publicly accessible,
on grounds of their commercial confidentiality. Each prison has a Government ‘Controller’
7 See Padfield [12].
8 See fn 3 above.
9 http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/news/65-cent-of-education-and-training-prisons-not-good-enough
10 See Padfield [12] for more details
11 Ludlow [7] Privatising Public Prisons: Labour Law And The Public Procurement Process (Hart).
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who supervises the way the contract is being carried out. But little is known about the
effectiveness of the role. Although originally envisaged as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the State in
the prison, they appear now to be more focused on contract management than on the rights
of individual prisoners. Not all private prisons have been successful. Ashfield Prison, which
opened in 1999, has been the subject of immense criticism12, and Buckley Hall was returned
to the public sector in 2000 after six years in the hands of a private company.
Properly regulated, fully accountable, private prisons might lead to improved prison
conditions, and indeed to improvements within the public sector. As Harding [3] wrote,
BIf privatization worked in such a way as to enable the private sector to allocate
punishment, there would be a profound and irreparable fissure in the balance of the
modern democratic state and the corresponding fealty which it could expect of its
citizens^ (at page 27). The private company has a crucial influence in many decisions
which affect the allocation of punishment: not least, the allocation of individual
prisoners to courses and programmes, and the granting of early release under the Home
Detention Curfew (HDC) scheme and in temporary release decisions. The private
sector not only manages the prison, but it influences the prison experience of the
prisoner, both the ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of punishment. Harding identifies what he
calls ten ‘tenets of accountability’, essential for productive cross-fertilization and
success. They provide a checklist against which to evaluate privatisation:
(i) The distinction between the allocation and the administration of punishment must
be strictly maintained, with the private sector’s role being confined to
administration.
(ii) Penal policy must not be driven by those who stand to make a profit out of it
(iii) The activities of the private sector and their relations with government must be
open and publicly accessible
(iv) What is expected of the private sector must be clearly specified.
(v) A dual system must not be allowed to evolve in which there is a run-down and
demoralized public sector and a vibrant private sector.
(vi) Independent research and evaluation, with untrammelled publication rights, must
be built into private sector arrangements.
(vii) Custodial regimes, programmes and personnel must be culturally appropriate
(viii) There must be control over the probity of the private contractors
(ix) There must be financial accountability
(x) The state must in the last resort be able to reclaim private prisons
I would suggest that the current system in England fails against several of these
measures. The private prisons appear to be amongst the ‘best’ and the worst’
performing prisons13.
12 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/prison-and-yoi/ashfield and
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-22755787.
13 Hulley [5] ‘Respect in prisons: Prisoners’ experiences of respect in public and private sector prisons’ 12
Criminology and Criminal Justice 3–23.; Liebling (2012) ‘Values, Practices and Outcomes in Public and
Private Sector Prisons’, in Helyar-Cardwell, V. (eds.) Delivering Justice: The role of the public, private and
voluntary sectors in the prison system. Criminal Justice Alliance publications. We need a great deal more
discussion of the moral, political and economic advantages and disadvantages of privatization: see Sandel and
Standing [17].
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The boundary of the ‘prison’
Another difficult conceptual issue arises from the definition of ‘prison’ and ‘prisoner’.
When does a prison sentence really end? In England and Wales, prisoners serving fixed
term sentences are likely to be released at half time, or even earlier on Home Detention
Curfew, when they will be monitored both by the private company running the
monitors and by probation services. There have been many attempts in recent years
to ‘join up’ prison and probation services, but not with great success. Gelsthorpe et al.
[2] analysed data on people dying under probation supervision, which revealed a stark
contrast between the concern shown by the authorities when someone dies in prison,
and the seemingly more cavalier attitude to those who die under the supervision of the
probation services. There are particular problems which arise in Approved Premises,
residential units which house offenders in the community. Approved Premises are often
perceived by offenders as difficult places in which to live, having more rigorous rules
than those enforced in ‘open prisons’. Prisoners required to live in Approved Premises
on release will often be the ‘dangerous’ offenders who have spent many years in prison,
most recently in ‘open prisons’. Paradoxically, on release they are required to live in
premises which feel more punitive than prison. Many of those who are recalled to
prison from this community part of the sentence ‘fail’ under the weight of the
supervision conditions [14]. Many ex-prisoners continue to be closely supervised for
the rest of their lives: a ‘life sentence’ means that even once released, an ex-offender
remains on license. There are many civil protective orders which hang over ex-
offenders for many years post release (see [13]). Those who seek to explore the
effectiveness of prison ‘monitors’ should concern themselves too with monitoring
post-prison licenses, and the longer-term effects of imprisonment. Here too the chal-
lenges of effective monitoring will become more difficult as probation services are
increasingly privatized14.
Part II: The key monitoring institutions
We now turn to review the role and legal framework which surrounds key monitoring
institutions:
HM inspectorate of prisons (HMIP)
The role of the Chief Inspector of Prisons is governed by s 5A of the Prison Act 1952
(inserted into the 1952 Act by s. 57 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982):
(1) Her Majesty may appoint a person to be Chief Inspector of Prisons.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Chief Inspector to inspect or arrange for the inspection of
prison in England and Wales and to report to the Secretary of State on them.
(3) The Chief Inspector shall in particular report to the Secretary of State on the
treatment of prisoners and conditions in prisons.
14 See Padfield [15] ‘The magnitude of the offender rehabilitation and BThrough the Gate^ resettlement
revolution’ Criminal Law Review 99–115
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(4) The Secretary of State may refer specific matters connected with prisons in
England and Wales and prisoners in them to the Chief Inspector and direct him
to report on them….
As well as prisons15, the Inspectorate inspects court cells16 and vehicles used to
transport prisoners 17. A vision of the Inspectorate’s role can be gained from its
statement of purpose. The current version (see [4]) is:
To ensure independent inspection of places of detention, to report on conditions
and treatment, and promote positive outcomes for those detained and the public.
This statement of purpose has varied considerably over time: for example, the
Annual Report 1999–2000 stated that it was
To contribute to the reduction in crime, by inspecting the treatment and condi-
tions of those in Prison Service custody, and Immigration Service detention, in a
manner that informs Ministers, Parliament and others and influences advances in
planning and operational delivery.
Today’s Bpromotion of positive outcomes^ seems somehow both more realistic and
vaguer than the aspirations of 1999–2000.
The Inspectorate carries out its work in a number of ways, but mostly by way of both
announced and unannounced inspections:
– Full inspections: All prisons holding adults are inspected once every five years.
Establishments holding juveniles (those under the age of 18) are inspected every three
years. Each inspection lasts for aweek, whilst the Inspectorate collects information from
various sources, including staff, prisoners and other people such as visitors. Inspection
findings are reported back to the prison’s managers and reports are published within
18 weeks of the inspection18. The prison is then expected to produce an action plan,
based on the recommendations made within the report, within a short time-frame.
– Follow-up inspections: These are unannounced and Bproportionate to risk^19. They
may involve in-depth analysis of areas of serious concern identified in the previous
full inspection, particularly on safety and respect.
15 The use of the term ‘prison’ here includes young offender institutions, secure training centres, immigration
detention facilities, police and court custody suites, customs custody facilities and military detention.
16 This duty was added by the Public Bodies (Abolition of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Courts Administration
and the Public Guardian Board) Order 2012/2401: see http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-
reports/hmi-prisons/court-custody-facilities-inspections.
17 Contracts to transport prisoners to and from prison have been issued to private sector companies for more
than 20 years. Known curiously as BPrisoner Escorting and Custodial Services^ (PECS), there is, as we go to
print, a scandal about alleged fraud in the management of some of these contracts: see http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-england-23868222 and www.gov.uk/government/news/moj-audit-of-serco-contracts-prison-
escort-services. See also http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-prisons/court-
custody-facilities-inspections.
18 These are available on line at http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmi-
prisons/prison-and-yoi
19 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmi-prisons/inspections-guidance/full-followup
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Since 2001, HMIP have published their ‘Expectations’, the standards against which they
inspect all prisons20. This document sets out the criteria the Inspectorate uses to appraise and
inspect prisons. The starting point remains outcomes for prisoners, not the management of
prisons. They follow a ‘healthy prison’ model which rests upon four key tests:
safety: prisoners, even the most vulnerable, are held safely
respect: prisoners are treated with respect for their human dignity
purposeful activity: prisoners are able, and expected, to engage in activity that is
likely to benefit them
resettlement: prisoners are prepared for release into the community, and helped to
reduce the likelihood of reoffending
The reports all follow this format, leading to a summary and recommenda-
tions, housekeeping points and examples of good practice. For the outsider,
they provide fascinating glimpses inside the prison. But as we shall note, it is
difficult to comment on the ‘effectiveness’ of these inspections. The Inspector-
ate also carries out thematic reviews with other bodies: for example, Examining
Multi-agency responses to children and young people who sexually offend
(2013), Remand Prisoners (2012) or Court Custody (2015). Over the years,
thematic reviews of Prison Service healthcare, women in prison, lifers and on
young offenders have all turned a spotlight onto particulars areas of concern
(though tangible outcomes are difficult to measure).
Strong ‘personalities’ have held the post of Chief Inspector: a retired diplomat,
Sir James Hennessy, from 1982 to 7; a retired judge, Judge Stephen Tumin, from
1987 to 1995; a retired General, Sir David (now Lord) Ramsbotham, from 1995 to
2001; the ex-chair of an influential human rights organization, Dame Anne Owers
from 2001 to 2010, and Nick Hardwick from 2001 to 2016, who previously
chaired the Independent Police Complaints Commission and before that the
Refugee Council. The newly appointed (2016) Chief Inspector is Peter Clarke, a
retired police officer. Thus, there has been a tradition of external appointments to
the position, which suggests a certain independence (though it is the Minister of
Justice who appoints the Chief Inspector21). Amongst the Inspectorate staff will be
those who have worked within the prison system, but I would suggest that this
enhances their credibility, by strengthening their expertise, rather than weakening
their independence22. Inspections are concerned particularly with the conditions in
establishments, the treatment of prisoners and the facilities available to them, but
the Minister may direct the Inspector’s attention to other matters. But the Chief
Inspector only has the power to recommend23.
20 The fourth version was published in 2012. See http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/hmipris/adult-
expectations-2012.pdf.
21 And, worryingly, their websites have now been brought under the Ministry of Justice’s ‘umbrella’.
22 There is a tension here, of course, between being ‘close’ and being ‘independent’: Cliquennois and
Champetier [1] suggest that a ‘cognitive union’ (cosiness?) between different stakeholders (at p. 407) may
explain shared risk management thinking and increased punitiveness in France.
23 Nor does he deal with complaints from individual prisoners, although similar complaints from a number of
sources might alert him to a problem; nor will he enter into correspondence with MPs, other organisations or
the public.
Monitoring prisons in England and Wales: who ensures the fair...
Compared with other criminal justice Inspectorates24, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons
has over the years often been more outspoken, and perhaps more influential, certainly
in the public domain. The other inspectorates have more often appeared as ‘in-house’
management monitors, though this is changing. The reports of the Prisons Inspectorate,
perhaps inevitably, often focus more on the fabric of prisons, or the general standards to
be found, not the treatment of prisoners, as such. And it is easy for some of the Chief
Inspector’s complaints to be ignored. As Morgan concluded many years ago, the Chief
Inspectors’ critiques
have sometime lacked policy bite because it is not always clear by what standards
he concludes that provisions are ‘impoverished’, ‘degrading’, ‘unacceptable’ and
so on’ ( [10] at page 1172).
The use of ‘expectations’ is a clear advance on the situation in 1997, but the Inspec-
torate can still be criticized for a lack of ‘bite’ which may result from the difficulty of
fixing clear standards.
Independent monitoring boards (IMB)
Every prison has an Independent Monitoring Board which is independent both of the
Inspectorate and of the Prison Service. Formal visiting committees developed from the
sixteenth century onwards. The Prison Act 1898 required every convict prison to have a
Board of Visitors consisting of magistrates and members of the public, and by 1971
every penal institution had a Board of Visitors. The name was changed in 2003 better to
reflect their function. The duties of Boards are prescribed by the Prison Rules 1999 (as
amended25), and include:
& Rule 77.- General duties of Boards
(1) The independent monitoring board for a prison shall satisfy themselves as to
the state of the prison premises, the administration of the prison and the
treatment of the prisoners.
(2) The board shall inquire into and report upon any matter into which the
Secretary of State asks them to inquire.
(3) The board shall direct the attention of the governor to any matter which calls
for his attention, and shall report to the Secretary of State any matter which
they consider it expedient to report.
(4) The board shall inform the Secretary of State immediately of any abuse which
comes to their knowledge.
(5) Before exercising any power under these Rules the board and any member of
the board shall consult the governor in relation to any matter which may affect
discipline.
24 For example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution
Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI), Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation.
25 Although the Government decided to change the name in 2001, the formal change did not happen until a
late amendment added to what became the Offender Management Act 2007. The formal changes to the name
in the Rules were made by the Prison (Amendment) Rules 2008/597 and came into force on 1 April 2008.
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& Rule 78.— Particular duties
(1) The independent monitoring board for a prison and anymember of the board shall
hear any complaint or request which a prisoner wishes to make to them or him.
(2) The board shall arrange for the food of the prisoners to be inspected by a
member of the board at frequent intervals.
(3) The board shall inquire into any report made to them, whether or not by a
member of the board, that a prisoner’s health, mental or physical, is likely to
be injuriously affected by any conditions of his imprisonment.
The Board of each prison is made up of unpaid volunteers, selected by way of
advertisement and local interview, but appointed by the Minister of Justice. There is no
longer a requirement to have magistrates on the Board. Any member of the Board has the
right to enter the establishment at any time and to have free access to every part of it and to
every prisoner (s. 6 Prisons Act 1952, as amended). Each Board is thus a sort of lay
Inspectorate, but with responsibilities for dealing with individual prisoners’ treatment and
complaints which the Inspectorate itself does not do26. Each IMB provides an annual
report on their prison27. From these, the National Council for IMBs provides an Annual
Report, which provides another useful insight into the abuse of power in prison28.
Until 1992 Boards also discharged quasi-judicial duties in dealing with the more serious
disciplinary charges29. As a result many prisoners saw them as part of the prison adminis-
tration, rather than as impartial providers of safeguards against maltreatment. Little research
has been done to explore whether they are now seen as any more independent of the Prison
Service. In some ways it seems unlikely: the secretariat of the IMB is within the Ministry of
Justice, and the annual reports of each IMB follow a fixed template required by the
Secretariat. Maguire, writing in 1985, suggested that Bvirtually all the evidence available
about the work of Boards of Visitors suggest they have consistently failed to fulfill their
potential^ ( [8], page 143; see also [9]). A little more recently, Robinson-Grindley [16]
echoed this, questioning whether Boards were carrying out their duties appropriately. Yet
anecdotal evidence would suggest that many prisoners do find it useful to speak to the IMB
members, andmany governors value the insights that are reported back to them by the IMB.
The ears and eyes of the public are present on prison wings, especially at times of crisis
(whenever a prisoner is placed in segregation, for example).
Yet there is also anecdotal evidence of poor working relationships and of the limited
impact of IMBs. If they do not have the trust of staff and management, they will have
little impact. Although a system of lay monitors, free to drop in on prisons at any time,
remains attractive, the reality may be that the level of commitment expected of Board
members deters potential new recruits. The typical IMB member is retired and middle
class. Is it appropriate to rely on unpaid volunteers to be the watchdog on prison
malpractice? It is important to ensure that these volunteers feel that they are
26 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/imb.
27 All publically available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/corporate-reports/imb/annual-reports-
2013.
28 www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/imb/behind-closed-doors-2012.pdf
29 Changed after the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Ezeh v UK
(2004) 39 EHRR 1.
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‘empowered’ to make a difference in order that high quality volunteers continue to
come forward. They must also themselves be effectively monitored.
The prisons and probation ombudsman
A Parliamentary Ombudsman (technically, the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration) was appointed to investigate complaints of maladministration in
1967, but he was much criticised for being ineffective in his influence on prison
administration (in the Report by Lord Woolf into the prison riots of 1990: see
[19]). The Government accepted Lord Woolf’s recommendation that there should
be a separate and independent Complaints Adjudicator, but preferred the title
‘Prison Ombudsman’. The first Prison Ombudsman, Sir Peter Woodhead, was
appointed in 1994. He was a retired Admiral who took his independence seriously,
having some public arguments with the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard.
He was replaced by Stephen Shaw, who held the post from 1999 to 2010. He had
previously been director of the NGO Prison Reform Trust, and was clearly too an
independent critic of the system. Nigel Newcomen, the current post-holder, is
criticized in some quarters because he was a Prison Service ‘insider’, but there is
no evidence that he is any less rigorous than his predecessors in dealing with
complaints. No enabling legislation has been passed, so the Ombudsman still has
no specific legislative powers, for example to award compensation. Nor can he
consider complaints made by prisoners’ friends or families. The Prison
Ombudsman’s first Six Month Review in 1995 pointed out, ‘some initial problems
in defining the interface with the Prison Service still need to be overcome’.
Judging by recent Annual Report 30 matters have changed little. In 1997 the
Ombudsman received 1960 letters from prisoners wishing to make a complaint.
Only 553 were eligible: the majority appear either not to have known of, or to
have had no faith in the Prison Service’s internal request/complaints system.
However, they must use this before the Prison Ombudsman can get involved. In
2014–15, the PPO received 4879 complaints. Of these 4438 (91%) were about the
Prison Service, 375 (8%) were about the Probation Service and 66 (1%) were
about immigration detention. Only 2111 were accepted for investigation31. It must
be immensely frustrating for prisoners to be told that their complaint is ineligible
because, for example, they have not exhausted the prison’s internal complaint
mechanism. Prisoners are often vulnerable, and all are vulnerable to the abuse of
power: complaining within a prison is often challenging. Unsurprisingly, adults
and long-term prisoners are prepared to complain more than other prisoners: they
are the prisoners with more time and more confidence. If one compares the areas
of complaints over the last 15 years, sadly the same issues dominate: lost property
and disciplinary adjudications still head the list, and money issues, transfers and
allocations between prisons, general conditions, security categorisations and re-
gimes activities all feature significantly32.
30 Available at http://www.ppo.gov.uk/docs/ppo-annual-report-2012-13.pdf
31 See http://www.ppo.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/PPO_Annual-Report-2014-15_Web-Final.
pdf#view=FitH
32 See Annual Report (footnote 20 above) for details.
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In 2004, the Ombudsman’s remit was expanded to cover investigations into deaths
in custody. When someone dies in prison, the prison must inform the PPO. The PPO (or
rather one of his investigators) then carries out an investigation. Their report not only
outlines the investigation findings, but also may make recommendations to improve the
quality of care provided in prisons. The investigation is separate from any internal
investigation, and from that of the coroner (see below). There have been well over 1000
investigations so far – 419 reports were added in 2014–15, for example. As well as
publishing the report of the investigation the PPO also publishes ‘Learning Lessons’
bulletins. Thus in 2013 they published a bulletin on learning from the investigations
into three recent deaths of children in custody. This concluded with a summary of 8
lessons to be learned:
1 Busy YOIs33 struggle to give the individual attention necessary to care for the most
vulnerable. Accordingly, allocation to an STC34 or specialist unit within YOIs, such
as the Keppel Unit at Wetherby, needs to be considered and pursued.
2 There are problems sharing information and a lack of shared understanding of
vulnerability which can hinder co-ordinated care of the children across agencies.
3 Assessments of vulnerability and risk of self-harm did not adequately weigh static
risk factors against presentation or fully take into account the complex ways
children can show emotional distress.
4 ACCT35 processes were insufficiently child-centred, and the involvement of senior
managers, families and outside agencies in care planning was too limited.
5 Managing risk, treating mental health, and the wider operation of YOI processes,
particularly disciplinary procedures, need to be better integrated to ensure children
are treated holistically and consistently.
6 YOIs need to ensure a more robust response to bullying and that reports of bullying
are acted upon.
7 Personal officers offer an important point of contact and support. They should be
assigned quickly upon reception and regular contact with the child or young person
fully documented.
8 Sources of external support, including but not limited to families, can be extremely
important. Enhanced access to this support at times of crisis and for those at
particular risk of self- harm should be facilitated wherever possible.
Another recent publication has sought to analyse the impact of their recommenda-
tions. The three largest categories of complaint - ‘health provision’, ‘emergency
response’ and ‘ACCT’- together make up over half of all recommendations made.
The current PPO appears determined to disseminate lessons from investigations, giving
priority to ensuring that the recommendations coming from his office are as ‘effective’
and ‘influential’ as possible. We return to this at the end of this paper.
33 Young Offender Institutions, holding offenders from 15 to 20: there are currently 10 YOIs run by the Prison
Service and two are privately run (Parc by G4S and Ashfield by Serco).
34 Secure Training Centre: there are 4 STCs holding boys and girls aged 12–17. They are run by private
companies (Serco and Rebound, owned by G4S), and include a mother and baby unit (at Rainsbrook STC)
with space for three girls and their babies.
35 ACCT stands for Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork. It is the process used when individuals have
self-harmed or are perceived to be ar risk of self-harm and suicide. See PSO 2700.
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Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
There are a number of influential NGOs which highlight issues and concerns, often
bringing test cases before the courts. They are funded by voluntary donations. Thus, we
might identify:
– the Howard League for Penal Reform, which was established in 1866 and
is a national charity working Bfor less crime, safer communities and fewer
people in prison^. It offers legal advice to young people in custody and
runs a number of well-publicized campaigns and inquiries, as well as
seeking to lobby politicians36.
– Liberty was founded in 1934 (as the National Council for Civil Liberties) and
works to Bpromote the values of individual human dignity, equal treatment and
fairness as the foundations of a democratic society^ by public campaigning, test
case litigation, parliamentary lobbying, policy analysis and the provision of free
advice and information37.
– JUSTICE is a broader law reform and human rights organization, founded in 1957,
which promotes improvements to the British legal system – through research,
education, lobbying and interventions in the courts. It is the UK section of the
International Commission of Jurists38.
– The Prison Reform Trust was set up more recently, in 1981, to campaign to
reduce the prison population and work towards a just, humane and effective
penal system. They too campaign largely by holding inquiries, doing
research and by informing the wider public about their work. Their Brom-
ley Fact Files are a well-respected source of prison data39.
– Inquest is another influential charity founded in 1981 which provides a free advice
service to bereaved people on contentious deaths and their investigation, with a
focus on deaths in custody. They do casework, research, parliamentary
campaigning and policy work.40
– Penal Reform International, formed in 1989, is another international penal
reform organisation.41
There are many other NGOs working within prisons, such as the Prisoners
Education Trust which funds educational opportunities in prison, and theatre
groups such as Cleanbreak, Playing for Time theatre, Synergy theatre and so
on. These are invaluable not just for the services that they provide, but because
they in some sense break down the prison walls, by involving ordinary mem-
bers of the public inside the prison. They are useful therefore in educating the
public about what goes on behind the prison wall. There are, though, concerns
about whether what might be considered to be ‘core’ services should be
provided by voluntary organisations. And whether NGOs, charities reliant on
36 See www.howardleague.org.
37 http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/about/index.php
38 http://www.justice.org.uk/pages/about-us.html
39 www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk; http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Publications/Factfile.
40 www.inquest.org.uk
41 www.penalreform.org
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the voluntary services of trustees, are themselves adequately accountable. It is
interesting too to consider the extent to which individual NGOs have influence
according to the personality and leadership skills of their own directors and
management.
The courts
Of course, a prisoner should be able to rely on the courts to uphold his/her legal rights.
‘The rule of law’ is a fundamental constitutional principle. According to Dicey, the
classic constitutional theorist of the nineteenth century,
... the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the
exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of
constraint.…. It means ... the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law
as opposed to the influence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide
discretionary authority on the part of the government. Englishmen are ruled by
the law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of the
law, but he can be punished for nothing else (Dicey, pages 188 and 202).
To what extent does this concept of the rule of law apply in prisons? One difficulty lies in
identifying the ‘law’. Parliament has been inactive in this area. The most recent Prison Act
was enacted as long ago as 1952, and was essentially a consolidation of earlier enactments
relating to prisons. It has little internal consistency and grants broad powers to the Secretary
of State (see section 1), including, for example, the power, with the approval of the Treasury,
to alter, enlarge or rebuild any prison and to build new prisons (section 33) and the power to
‘make rules for the regulation and management of prisons...and for the classification,
treatment, employment, discipline and control of persons to be detained’. The power to
make prison rules is exercisable by statutory instrument (section 52), and the Prison Rules
made under this section are therefore delegated legislation. Although the Act specifies that
every prison shall have ‘a governor, a chaplain and a medical officer and such other officers
as may be necessary’ the powers and duties of these officers are not spelled out42.
The courts supervise what goes on in prisons by means of ‘judicial review’, the common
law power of the High Court to stop other legal bodies from acting outside their powers. The
vast majority of decisions (those on allocation, categorization, transfer, privileges etc) taken
in prison are not ‘appealable’ to the courts. ‘Judicial review’ is not an appeal on the merits of
a decision, but merely a way of reviewing the legality of decision-making. Thus a decision-
maker’s decision must not be biased; it must not be vitiated by illegality, irrationality or
procedural impropriety43. There are many important examples of the courts safeguarding
rights of prisoners under judicial review proceedings: this is the essence of judicial protection
under the common law. Thus, simply by way of example, R v Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Simms and O’Brien; Same, ex p Main [1999] 3 WLR 328
where the House of Lords allowed the prisoners’ appeals against the banning of oral
interviews in prisons with journalists, and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26 where the House held that a policy requiring that prisoners
42 See Loucks and Padfield [6] for a fuller discussion of the Prison Rules.
43 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374).
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be absent when privileged legal correspondence held by them in their cells was examined by
prison officers was unlawful44.
There are other ways that events in prisons may be aired in the courts: the prison
authorities may be sued in civil law (most obviously for a breach of the tort of
negligence) or even prosecuted for a criminal offence, perhaps health and safety
regulations. There have been a depressing number (only a few, but any number is
depressing) of killings in prisons in recent years, of prisoners by other prisoners – these
are prosecuted in the criminal courts. It remains to be seen whether the creation of the
new offence of ‘corporate manslaughter’ in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate
Homicide Act 2007, under which companies and organisations may be prosecuted for
the offence of corporate manslaughter, has any impact. Serious management failures
must be proved to have resulted in a gross breach of a duty of care. It seems unlikely that
this new offence will improve safety and conditions; indeed it may make prisons more
defensive and risk-averse.
The impact of the jurisprudence of the European court of human rights
Even before the Human Rights Act 1998 brought the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law, there were numerous decisions of the European Court which
had an impact on the development of English law. But the enactment of the Human
Rights Act 1998 blew fresh air into the question of prisoners’ rights. When Tony Blair’s
‘New Labour’ Government won the General Election of 1997, after some 18 years of
Conservative Government, their election pledges included a commitment to ‘Bring
Rights Home’. Although the Human Rights Act was swiftly enacted in 1998 it was not
brought into force for two years as the Government became only too aware that they
had to check that prison (and other) practices were ‘human rights compliant’. The
Convention has indeed been much used by prisoners to enforce their claims against the
prison authorities45. But equally, the Government continues to feel free to resist some
decisions of the Court, such as the rulings of the Grand Chamber in Hirst v UK (2006)
42 EHRR 41 and Scoppola v Italy [2013] 1 Costs LO 62, which have made it clear that
a general ban on prisoners voting infringed Art. 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention.
Indeed, in Chester v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63, the Supreme Court
refused to get further involved in this ‘stand-off’ between the UK Government and the
European Court. As Lord Mance put it, there is Bno prospect of any further meaningful
dialogue between United Kingdom Courts and Strasbourg^ (at para 34).
The thorny subject of prisoners’ votes is not the only politically contentious area: the
legality of life sentences without possibility of release (except on the very narrow
grounds of compassionate release) is another area of ‘stand-off’. In Vinter v UK46, the
44 The list could be a long one: many prisoners’ rights have evolved through successful litigation. An example
that I like to discuss with students is R (P) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 2002
where the judges decided that the Prison Service’s mother and baby policy was too rigid: were the judges
meddling too much in policy issues? I think not.
45 An early dramatic example of the impact was the House of Lords decision to declare the Home Secretary’s
role in fixing the ‘tariff’ that those sentenced to a mandatory life sentence for murder must serve as a minimum
term to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights in R (Anderson) v SSHD [2002] 2
WLR 1800.
46 (2016) 63 EHRR 1 (decided July 2013).
Padfield N.
Grand Chamber of the ECHR upheld a complaint, concluding that a ‘whole life’
prisoner is entitled to know what he must do to be considered for release and under
what conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take place or may be
sought. By a majority of 16–1, they held that this applies from the moment the sentence
is imposed. The majority said (at para 122):
Although the requisite review is a prospective event necessarily subsequent to the
passing of the sentence, a whole life prisoner should not be obliged to wait and
serve an indeterminate number of years of his sentence before he can raise the
complaint that the legal conditions attaching to his sentence fail to comply with the
requirements of Article 3 in this regard. This would be contrary both to legal
certainty and to the general principles on victim status within the meaning of that
term in Article 34 of the Convention. Furthermore, in cases where the sentence, on
imposition, is irreducible under domestic law, it would be capricious to expect the
prisoner to work towards his own rehabilitation without knowing whether, at an
unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be introduced which would allow
him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be considered for release. A whole life
prisoner is entitled to know, at the outset of his sentence, what he must do to be
considered for release and under what conditions, including when a review of his
sentence will take place or may be sought. Consequently, where domestic law
does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence,
the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the moment of
the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration.
Disappointingly the Court of Appeal did not agree. In Attorney General’s Reference (No 69
of 2013)47, a strong five-judge court held that whole-life sentences were not incompatible
with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art.3. Judges could continue to
impose them in exceptional cases. The compassionate release scheme provided for by s.30
of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was compatible with Art.3, in that it provides offenders
serving whole-life sentences with the possibility of release in exceptional circumstances.
And inHutchinson vUK48, the Fourth Chamber of the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights, by
a majority49, appeared to climb down: they accepted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal
that it was of no consequence that the LiferManual50 had not been revised, since it was
clearly established in domestic law that the Secretary of State was bound to exercise
his power under section 30 in a manner compatible with Article 3. If an offender
subject to a whole life order could establish that Bexceptional circumstances^ had
arisen subsequent to the imposition of the sentence, the Secretary of State had to
consider whether such exceptional circumstances justified release on compassionate
grounds. Regardless of the policy set out in the Lifer Manual, the Secretary of State
had to consider all the relevant circumstances, in a manner compatible with Article 3.
Any decision by the Secretary of State would have to be reasoned by reference to the
47 [2014] EWCA Crim 188.
48 (2015) 61 EHRR 13.
49 Note the wise and witty dissenting judgment of the about-to-retire Judge Kalaydjieva, of Bulgaria.
50 Prison Service Order (PSO) 4700 used to be known as the Lifer Manual but is now known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Manual.
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circumstances of each case and would be subject to judicial review, which would serve
to elucidate the meaning of the terms Bexceptional circumstances^ and Bcompassionate
grounds^, as was the usual process under the common law. In the judgment of the
Court ofAppeal, domestic law therefore did provide to an offender sentenced to awhole
life order hope and the possibility of release in the event of exceptional circumstances
which meant that the punishment was no longer justified (at para 23).
It remains unclear when or indeed whether the Government might consider releasing
a ‘whole life’ sentence prisoner on rehabilitative grounds, rather than on grounds of
terminal ill-health51. But, for our purposes, these examples illustrate the tension between
the English courts and the European Court of Human Rights, exacerbated by the
political mood which seems to be turning determinedly against ‘Europe’. But the courts
are keen to stress that the common law is alive and well. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court inOsborn and Booth v The Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61 unanimously allowed
the appeals of three prisoners who were challenging the refusal of the parole authorities
(two cases in England, the other in Northern Ireland) to allow them an oral hearing. The
judgment is explicit that the removal of the ‘right’ to an oral hearing in the Parole Board
(Amendment) Rules 2009 (SI 2009/408) was not lawful and Lord Reed is clear that the
decision is grounded in the common law, and not on the European Convention on
Human Rights. It is Bcommon law standards of procedural fairness^whichmean that the
Parole Board should hold an oral hearing whenever fairness to the prisoner requires such
a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake:
The values underlying both the Convention and our own constitution require that
Convention rights should be protected primarily by a detailed body of domestic
law. The Convention taken by itself is too inspecific to provide the guidance which
is necessary in a state governed by the rule of law … The importance of the
[Human Rights] Act is unquestionable. It does not however supersede the protec-
tion of human rights under the common law or statute, or create a discrete body of
law based upon the judgments of the European court. Human rights continue to be
protected by our domestic law, interpreted and developed in accordance with the
Act when appropriate. (para 56–57)
Thus, should the UK Government withdraw from ‘Europe’, the common law will
continue, in theory, to protect the rights of prisoners. In practice, the reality is that it is
not easy for prisoners to access good quality and free legal advice. The Government is
keen to save money on legal advice for prisoners. Legal advice and advocacy services
are surely an essential part of fair procedures.
Coroners’ courts52
Coroners’ courts have existed since the Middle Ages, with a duty to investigate deaths: an
inquest must be heard whenever a death occurs in custody, and the coroner then sits with a
51 As the Court said in Vinter, it is surely capricious (or simply unfair?) to expect the prisoner to work towards
his own rehabilitation without knowing whether, at an unspecified, future date, a mechanism might be
introduced which would allow him, on the basis of that rehabilitation, to be considered for release?
52 Perhaps the best practical guides to coroners’ courts are Thomas et al. Inquests: a practitioner’s guide
(Legal action group) and Inquests (Hart)
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jury53. The current version of the law is to be found in the Coroners Act 1988, as amended,
and the Coroners Rules 1984, also much amended 54. A coroner’s inquest can be a
powerful tool – families may be re-assured by the public exploration of issues, including
the cross-examination of witnesses. But the process also has significant limitations: it is
often slow, and it may well be adjourned if criminal proceedings are initiated55. Perhaps
most useful for those who want to learn lessons to prevent future deaths in custody, are the
‘Rule 43 reports’which coroners publish when they wish to draw issues or concerns to the
attention of those who have the power to take action. These Reports56, and the responses to
them, are copied to all properly interested persons and to the Lord Chancellor and a
summary of them is published twice a year, by the Ministry of Justice57. These explored
such issues as the need for training in resuscitation and first aid; the importance of
transfering records (particularly medical records) between prisons; of psychiatric services
in prisons; of arrangements for auditing night patrols and for transfering prisoners both
within prisons, and to other prisons. A recurrent theme is the need to improve communi-
cations systems.
Part III: Conclusions
There are thus a plethora of accountability mechanisms in England and Wales. The
Chief Inspector of Prisons (and his team) are, I would argue, vital as a body which gets
a certain publicity for their often hard-hitting reports58. The PPO is a useful final step in
the complaints ladder. The IMBs are also important – walking around the wings,
dealing with prisoner’s applications (which are usually ‘complaints’) – a visible face
of the ‘public’ behind the wall. It may be that the PPO is more useful not as a
complaints reviewer, but in his different role of investigator into deaths in custody. It
is difficult to tease out the different role of (and indeed resources available to) the PPO
from that of the coroner’s jury. One is clearly a more investigative inquiry, the other a
public forum for challenging evidence.
It would be useful to have a clear analysis of the inter-relationship of these various
monitoring and investigative bodies. This article started with three introductory issues.
The first was an introduction to the work of the ‘National Preventative Mechanism’
53 Coroners are different to ‘ordinary’ judges: they may have a medical as well as a legal qualification, and
they mostly work part-time as coroners. The coroner’s jury is also different to an ‘ordinary’ criminal jury,
made up of only 8 members as opposed to 12. They may reach a variety of different verdicts (from accidental
death to suicide, unlawful or lawful killing, open or narrative verdict) and not just the simple, ‘guilty’ or ‘not
guilty’ of the criminal trial. The procedure at an inquest is less adversarial than that of a criminal trial, with the
coroner taking an active role in questioning witnesses. Several different parties (prison officers or bereaved
families) may be represented at the hearing: not simply the state and the defendant as in a criminal trial.
54 A guide is to be found at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/burials-and-coroners/guide-charter-coroner.
pdfrule 43 reports coroner
55 See Coroners Statistics 2015 at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/525916/coroners-statistics-annual-2015-england-and-wales.pdf.
56 So-called since the power is to be found in Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984
57 http://www.justice.gov.uk/coroners-burial-cremation/coroners/rule-43
58 Empirical research should explore which ‘monitor’ in fact has most impact on those who run prisons ‘on the
ground’. It may well be that the arrival of a team of inspectors without any prior announcement is unsettling
and does little to encourage a more ‘humane’ system: staff may well become more defensive. Not many of us
welcome criticism!
Monitoring prisons in England and Wales: who ensures the fair...
(NPM). Whilst it is clear that the UK NPM fulfils the UK’s legal obligations under
OPCAT, it is not clear to what extent it has contributed to the fairer treatment of
prisoners. The UK government designated HM Inspectorate of Prisons (England and
Wales) to coordinate the NPM. It would appear that internally, HMIP is working with
the 19 other ‘mechanisms’ to strengthen the protection of those in detention through
coordinated and collaborative work on relevant issues. Co-ordination and collaboration
come at a price. Without a careful analysis of cost, impact and role, it is difficult to
conclude more specifically than to comment that, in England and Wales, a complex
variety of checks on the use and abuse of powers in prison exist. To me, this complexity
is to be welcomed59. If the relationship between different ‘monitors’ is unclear and even
uncomfortable, there may be increased vigilance and accountability. Accountability
should not be comfortable.
Our second introductory issue was privatization. The growing use of private, and
potentially not for profit organisations, in the running of prisons adds a new level of
complexity. The ‘closed’ world of the prison is rightly monitored by a variety of bodies,
contributing ‘checks and balances’ to safeguard prisoners against the abuse of power.
Perhaps the monitoring bodies described in this article would be less vital if more was
done internally to deal with complaints and grievances 60. But this paper simply
concerns the role of external monitors. Our third introductory issue was the boundary
of the ‘prison’: penal sanctions hand over prisoners for many years after release. I
would suggest that we should monitor the way punishments in the community are
carried out quite as stringently as we monitor what goes on in prisons.
I offer only two small conclusions. The first concerns the existing legal structure,
which is too loose to provide adequate guidance or constraints upon the Prison Service,
and indeed the main constraints on privatized companies are often unpublished con-
tracts. Despite the major changes in prison policy over the last few decades, there have
been few significant changes to the legal framework. It is not surprising that many of
those who examine the prison system have concluded with a call for enforceable
standards in prisons (for example, Woolf [20]). There must be a ‘rudder by which
overseers can steer’ ( [10], p 1171). Although the incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 has,
in the eyes of many, had an important impact on the culture of public decision-making,
which is now more openly tied to the standards of the European Convention61, this
positive interpretation of the role of the European Court is not supported by a majority
of the media or politicians.
The second conclusion is that we need a great deal more research, particularly
qualitative research, to understand the inter-relationship of the various external moni-
tors and their impact on those who work and live in prisons. There are two prior
59 A PhD student at the Law Faculty in the University of Cambridge is currently seeking to evaluate the
various mechanisms of accountability for deaths in custody.
60 Given the dramatic changes to the rules on the provision of free legal advice, it is particularly important that
the internal complaints system is robust and effective. Nor should we forget that a fundamental key to decent
prisons is effective and moral internal leadership. The financial cuts imposed on the prison service in recent
years have inevitably damaged standards.
61 See Lord Irvine, then Lord Chancellor, who wrote in ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act: Parliament, the
courts and the executive’ [2003] PL 308 that the HRA Brepresents one small manageable step for our courts;
but it is a major leap for our constitution and our culture…It has moved public decision-making in this country
up a gear by harnessing it to a set of fundamental standards^ (at p. 324).
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challenges. It is difficult to assert what ‘effective’ monitoring might look like without
exploring the purposes of punishment and the purposes of the prison system. Attempts
to ‘break down the closed walls’ of the prison, to allow in the eyes of the public, in
order to provoke a more informed debate are to be welcomed. But even if we were
agreed on the purposes of the prison, we would still have to understand the reality of the
impact of these various monitoring bodies. It is easy to assert that, for example, the
Chief Inspector of Prisons provides an excellent service by arriving unannounced to
inspect prisons. It keeps prison staff ‘on their toes’. But what evidence do we have that
this actually drives up standards? Might some forms of critical intervention make
prison staff more defensive, less open to dialogue? It is easy to assert that the
Independent Monitoring Board is an excellent system whereby ordinary people wander
freely around a prison, keeping the staff and management on their toes. But unless they
have the trust of the Governor and his/her senior management team, their interventions
may be quite ineffective. Let’s Bbreak down the walls of the prison^ to allow greater
debate and significant research.
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